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THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL 
James A. Barber, Jr. 
Inll"Oduction. 'l'lw argumenL for arms 
conlrol is persum;ive: arms raers arc 
boLh expensive and inherenLly danger-
ous; Llwri!fore, any con Lrol or elimina-
tion of arms is good. UnforLunaLely, 
appt·aling as this formulation may he, it 
can III' a hazardous onc, ht'rause it i~ an 
o\'t'r:::implifieation. AILhough arms con-
Lrol can he highly ht'neficial, all arms 
control is lIot n('ces~arily good, and it 
can he dangerous to assume thaL it is. 
Too of Len those of us whose profes-
sional concern is miliLary securiLy do 
noL pay adt'quaLe aLLention to the rela-
tionship hetween ~ecurity and arms COIl-
trol. Yet arms conlrol and mililary 
s(!eurity arc inlegral parts of the sallie 
suhject-the safety and well-being of thc 
nation. Bt'eause of tilt' curren t arms 
control dialog with thc SovieL Union, it 
is useful, and pt·rhaps necessary, to 
examilH' the ohj('cti\'!~s of arllls conlrol 
mOrt~ cardully. In vi('w of thc frequent 
laek of clarity !'neounl!~rl'(l in discus-
sions of arllls ('ontrol and di:::armalll('nt, 
a revirw lUlIl reslalement of fundamen-
tal consideraLions should be useful. 
Arms control and disarmament, al-
though similar, are noL identical. Dis-
armament necessarily involves an arms 
rrduction; arms control involves an arms 
limitation of either quantity or typc and 
mayor may not constitute a reduction. 
1 L is en tirely possible, al though unlikely, 
Ihat an arms control arrangement might 
involve an acLual increase in arms. Arms 
control, as the more inclusive term, will 
he used in thc remainder of this discus-
sIOn. 
The Objectives of Arms Control. 
William C. Fost!!r has stated the basic 
objective of arms control succinctly: 
"[ n the final analysis, the decision 
whether to negotiate a given arms-
("ontrol agreement boils down to weigh-
ing thl' risks of undertaking it against 
II\(' risks of not undertaking it. »1 In 
other words, arms control is intcndl'd to 
do something for us, to, in sOllie way, 
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leave us in a position preferable to that 
before arms control. 
Thus any arms control treaty is not 
an end in itself, hut only a possible 
means to several ends. As such, it must 
be evaluated in terms of how well it is 
de~igned to accomplish its purpose. It is 
simply inadequate to assume that all 
possible arms control arrangements are 
useful or even that, because an arrangc-
ment serves one useful purpose, it is 
worthwhile. An arrangcmcnt which is 
highly desirable from one point of view 
may be extremely dangerous from an-
other. It is necessary, therefore, to 
subject any proposed agreement to 
painstaking scrutiny to determine 
whetlwr or not it will help us reach our 
desired objectives. 
What arc the objectives of arms 
control? Three areas of bene£it have 
been -Claimed: One has to do with 
security: that arms control makes us 
safer than we would othcrwisc he. The 
sccond benefit is economic: that arms 
control would save money. The third 
benefit is political: that arms control 
assists in the achievement of nonmili-
tary national objectives. Each partici-
pant in a system of arms control seeks 
these same benefits, though they may 
be gained in differing proportion and to 
different degree. These objcctives are 
comprchcnsive in the sem;e that all 
important cffects of any practical arms 
control or disarmament arrangement 
will fall into one of thc three catrgorics. 
For purposcs of analysis, howevrr, 
the first catcgory, dcaling with sccurity, 
needs to be suhdividcd. The effcet of 
arms control on security is complicated 
and can bc contradictory. If the analysis 
can be elarified by dividing the question 
of security into several parts, it will 
help. From a spcurity point of view, the 
three questions thllt must hI' m;ked of a 
pro~pl'ctive arllls eontrol armngl'nwnt 
art': (I) 1I0w dol'S it arrl'ct the proh.l-
hility of war'?; (~) What effed dOI's it 
have upon the inlt'nsity or duration' of 
war if it does hreak out?; and P) What 
is the effect on our position relative to 
potential opponents? The reason fur 
distinguishing these three aspects of 
security is that, although they are inter-
related, lIrms control does not ncccs-
sarily accomplish thcm cqually and may 
accomplish one at the expense of the 
others. 
After subdividing the objective of 
security and adding the economic and 
political objectives, there are then five 
fundamental qucstions to be asked of 
any potential arms control arrangement. 
These are: (I) How does it affect the 
probability of war? (2) What is its effect 
on the intensity or duration of war? (3) 
What is its effect on our position rcla-
tive to potential opponcnts? (4) Does it 
save money? and (5) Docs it help in 
achieving nonmilitary mltional objec-
tives? It is highly improbablc thal any 
practical system of arms control will 
provide favorable answers to all five 
questions. Thus it is necessary to weigh 
gains in some areas against disadvantages 
in olhers. 
The remainder of this discussion is 
devoted to a consideration of each of 
these five areas, their interaction, and 
the degree to which they are achicvable 
through arms control. 
Arms Control and the Probability of 
War. Prohably the mo~t fUlltJament:t1 
argument in favor of disarmament or 
arms control, and certainly the one 
most frcquently asscrted, is thal arJlls 
races and high levels of armament are 
primary causes of war, and that thcir 
limitation or elimination will make war 
less likely. For example, in a highly 
respected book, World Peace Through 
. World Law, Grenville Clark and Louis B. 
Sohn state that "experience teaches that 
long-continUl'd arms raceS have usually 
ended in violent connict, since the fears 
and tensions engendered by the compe-
tition cre'llt: <III atlllosplwre in which 
war lIIay hmak out almost by m'ddent 
and without a fixed design for war on 
either side. »2 Despite the prevalence of 
this view, however, iL is by no means 
uncontested. I n a perceptive recent 
book, Evan Luard, for exmnple, after 
careful examination of the historical 
relationship between the level of arma-
ment and the outbreak of war, con-
cludes: 
There is in fact no clear evidence, 
nor obvious reason to suppose, 
that the danger of war has ever 
borne, or bears today, any close 
relationship to the volume of 
weapons possessed. There is cer-
tain historical evidence to support 
the opposite view (the fact that 
wars often break out when na-
tions are poorly armed, as in the 
Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean 
War, the Balkan Wars, and others, 
or stay at peace when highly 
armed, as between 1948 and 
] 968). If the will to war itself is 
unchanged, arms will usually be 
found to wage it.3 
The fact is that the relationship 
he tween levels of armament and the 
stahility of peace is a complicated one 
and very far from the simple notion that 
arms cause wars. In some circumstances, 
even the failure to enter into an arms 
race can hi! dangerous to peace. Hedley 
Bull has stated that the military factor 
most important in hringing about the 
Second World War was "the failure of 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union to 
engage in the arms race with sufficient 
vigor, their insufficient response to the 
rearmamcnt of Germany.,,4 
It would therefore appear that under 
the right circumstances some kinds of 
armament contribute to stability, while 
other kinds are destahilizing. As an 
example, given the present state of 
mutunl nuclear deterrcnce between the 
Unitcd States and thl! ~()viet Union, the 
situation is more stnble if both sides 
have relatively invulnerahle nuclear 
strike forces, tending to make both sides 
less trigger happy. I f both sides pos-
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sessed only vulnerable strike systcms, 
suse('ptihle to being inenpncit'ltml by II 
first strikc by the opposing side, thc 
situation would obviously be much less 
stable. Therefore, an arms control ar-
rangement which eliminated invulner-
able strike systems while leaving vulner-
able systems intact would be destabi-
lizing. 
I n the present state of our under-
standing, it is not possible t9 state 
unequivocally any general relationships 
between armament and the stability of 
peace, although some tentative hypo-
theses might be suggested. For example, 
under present circumstances, anyLhing 
which reduces the credibility of deter-
rence would appear Lo be destabilizing. 
Dynamic changes in relative military 
strength, whether numerical or techno-
logical, also appear to be dangerous: a 
powerful nation losing ground to a more 
dynamic potential opponent has a 
strong incentive to initiate hostilities 
bcfore its relative position hecomes 
worsc. On the other hand, developments 
which assist in providing prompt and 
reliable information about the capabili-
ties and intentions of potential op-
ponenLs (such as the "hot line" and 
survcillance satelliLes) probably con-
tribute to stability by helping to prevent 
war hy accidcnt or miscalculation. 
Furthcr complicating the relationship 
between armament and the outbreak of 
war is the fact that there arc many kinds 
of war, and measures which make one 
kind of war less probaLle may increase 
the chances of another kind. A fool-
proof scheme of nuclear disarmament, 
for example, might increase the proba-
hility of conventional conflict by re-
moving the caution engendered hy the 
fear of nuclear escalation. 
To summarize, thcre is a relationship 
bctween armament and the probability 
of war, hut it is ncither direel nor 
simplt·. Pending bctter knowll·dge of tlw 
relationship than we now have, ahout 
the best that can he achieved is a 
case-by-case cxamination of tht: implica-
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tions of specific wcnpons systems and 
weapons control proposals in nn 
attempt to determine their probable 
effect. I n such an evaluation, it is 
important to keep all of the ohjectives 
clearly in view. lise of formal criteria, 
similar to those discussed here, can he 
useful in the study of probable effecls. 
Arms Control and the Intensity of 
War. Closely related to the attempt to 
reduce the probability of war is a desire 
to limit the intensity of conflict if war 
docs brenk out. [n cffect, this is an 
attempt to prevent certain kinds of 
wars-the more violent kinds-rather 
than a general effort to prevent all war. 
The effort to reduce the inten~ily of 
war today gains much of its urgeney 
from the existence of nuclcar weapons 
and their delivery systems. I t is widcly 
recognized that a total nuclear war 
would be destructive heyond anything 
that has been imagined heretofore, and 
this makes the problem of preventing 
large-scale nuclear war a first order of 
priority. 
There are three main points to be 
considered here: (I) not all arms control 
or disarmament arrangements serve to 
limit intensity if war does break out; (2) 
in making some kinds of war less likely 
we may be increasing the prohahility of 
other kinds; and 0) a lower initial level 
of armament does not necessarily ensure 
a less violent war. 
Certain kinds of arms control mea-
sures, designed to reduce the prohability 
of nuclear war, may accomplish that 
purpose but at the same time actually 
increase the destructiveness of war if it 
does break out. For example, a bnn on 
defensive systems, such as the t\ Bi\l, 
might enhance the credibility of dt'ter-
rence and thus reduce the probability of 
nuclear war. But if nuclear war did 
hrt'ak out und!'r tht'se circulIIstances. 
holh $ides would be lik('ly to $11I"[l'r 
considerahly greater destruction than if 
they had effective defensive systems. 
So lon~ as deterrence remains a 
primary means of !'ecurity, the deploy-
nwnt hy either sidt' of a really df(·(·tive 
ABi\1 systcm would havc a serious de-
stabilizing effect. First, by assuring the 
power which deploys it that the 
enemy's offensive weapons could no 
longer deliver unacceptable damage, it 
lessens inhibitions ngainst emharking on 
courses of action which might lead to 
nuclear war. Second, it forces the other 
side in self-defense to escalate the arms 
race in an attempt to restore the pre-
vious balance. 
Even more dangerous, and more 
likely, is an AB'\1 defense which would 
ht' effective only if a first strike tJrilsti-
cully reduced the enemy's offensive 
cupahility. Then, in a crisis situatioll, 
this would forc(' sl'rious consilli'ration 
of launching a prcemptive strike to 
accomplish this drastic reduction. 
Similarly, it would tend to make any 
enemy triggcr happy for fear of being 
caught on the ground by such a pre-
emptive strike. 
Thus, both offensive and defensive 
weupons arc part of the arms race, and 
in a situation of mutual deterrence, 
peace is most stable if both sides possess 
an assured capacity to inflil't unaccept-
able dnmnge on the other side even aftcr 
ahsorbing a surprise allack. All other 
things being equal, it sCl'ms c1enr that an 
arms control agrcemcnt limiting A BM 
dcployment hy hoth the United States 
mHI the U.S.S.R. to, at most, a "thin" 
tJl'ployment is in the best interest of 
hoth countries. Paradoxically, in n 
world of nuclear weapons and mutual 
deterrence, improvements in defcnse 
can incrense the likelihood of war. 
The serond point is that measures 
which reduce the probability of one 
kind of wnr can increase the probability 
of other kinds. As alrcndy mentioned, 
any reduction in the f('ar that smaller 
eonflicts lIIay I'~ealate to nudear war 
cO\lld ~ervc Lo reduce inhihitions a~aillHt 
cngaging in Iimitcd wars. Further, any 
scrious rcduction in conventional mili-
tary capability by mcnns of arms con-
trol ean reduce the capacity of estab-
Ih;lwd ~overnmenLc; to dl'fend them-
selves against insurgency, thus increasing 
the incentives for potential insurgents 
and therefore the probability of civil 
war. 
The third point is that a lower level 
of armamenLc; docs not necessarily en-
sure a less violent war if war docs break 
out. A conflict in which one opponent 
is wdl prepared may result in a sharp, 
short war with a quick decision. Cases in 
point might he the Arah-Israeli con-
f1iC'ls. On the other hand, if hoth or 
nritlwr arc prrpared for war, early 
engag('Ill('nts might result in mutual 
drstruelion of ready forces followed by 
a long process of further mobilization 
and aLlrition and greater destrudiveness 
and violence overall. I t is not intended 
to imply that wars will always he more 
surr~ieal and 11<'nee less violent when 
hl'twl'en militarily prepared nations, hut 
only that lower levds of armament do 
not IH·c(·ssarily insure a less d"strudive 
war. 
In <Ill('mpting to limit the intensity 
of war, the most important thing we ean 
ask of any arms control arrangement is 
that it redure thr prospect of large-scale 
war-particularly of large-scale war using 
w('apons of mass destruction. In so 
doing we must rr~alize that it may Il(~ 
l1('eessary to accept some increased pros-
pect of le~ser wars. Al'o IJI'fore, no arms 
con trol mrasure can provide a panacea. 
Relative Advantage. lIistoril~ally, 
arms control or disarmament awee-
ments have heen successfully negoliatl'd 
only where a careful aLLempt has heen 
made to esscntially preserve prevailing 
strength ratios among the participating 
nations. Despite this, any control or 
reduction of armaments will almost 
inevitably produce shifts in relative 
powl·r. 
Ohviously, a change in relativc pow('r 
status will occur bclwl'l'n tlw partici-
pants in the al!rrement anrl the nonpar-
ticipants. For c?,ample, a hilateral agrce-
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mcnt he tween the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. to drastically reduce levels of 
armament might be successful in pre-
serving the approximate balance of mili-
tary strength hetween those two powers 
hut would increase the relative strength 
of Communist China. 
A second kind of shift is more subtle. 
No two countries havc exactly the same 
kind of security problems, and therefore 
the utility of any particular kind of 
weapons system varies from country to 
country. Historically, Great Britain em-
phasized the importance of a strong 
navy, while continental powers placcd 
first emphasis upon their armies. In the 
contemporary world, land-hased, me-
dium-range missiles would appear to 
have more utility for the Soviet Union 
than for the United States. Thus, even 
where some kind of numerical ratio is 
preserved, the implications Of control or 
reduction of arms differ. 
To pursue the maller further, it has 
already heen pointed out that arms 
control can havc thc effect of making 
cerLain kinds of wars more likely or less 
likely. This can significantly affect the 
relativc power of nations. For cxample, 
gcneral and complete disarmament, that 
is the abolition of major wcapons and 
forces, wen' it fca1;ihle, would have 
~wveral notmvorthy effects Oil the rela-
tivc strength of nations. J t would almost 
certainly reduce the influence of the 
major powers. By reducing the capacity 
of esLabli~hed governments to put down' 
insurgenLs, it might encourage "wars of 
national libcration." This would not 
nec(~ssarily be a disadvantage to the 
West. Had (l:cneral disarmament heen in 
effect in 1968, it seems rcasonahle to 
helieve that Czechoslovakia, for ex-
ampl(~, would no longer be a Soviet 
salellitc. 
In general, thc effects of arms con-
trol agreements arc to reduce the mili-
tary power of the parties relative Lo the 
rcst of the world and to cause a raLhcr 
complex shift in their power relative to 
each other. Thc probability is strong 
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that under any substantial arms conlrol, 
major powers will have to accept, on 
balance, some relative as well as abso-
lute diminution in military power. Some 
relative disadvantage may, of course, be 
accepted if other arguments in favor of 
the agreement are strong. In the nature 
of things, however, any proposal which 
shifts the balance clearly in one's own 
favor relative to potential opponents is 
unlikely to be accepted by the other 
side. Furthermore, the two sides are not 
likely to view any specific proposal in 
the same way. 
Arms Control and Military Expen-
diture. At a time when domestic claims 
upon governmental resources are climb-
ing sharply, one of the particularly 
attractive features of the prospect of 
arms control is the expectation that 
large sums of money can be saved. At 
first glance this would appear to be so, 
for the essence of arms control is the 
acceptance of a lower level of military 
investment, at least of a particular kind, 
than would otherwise have been made. 
Unfortunalt'ly, the relationship is not 
quite that simple-limitations on arma-
ment do not necessarily save money. 
Systems of arms control themselves 
can be quite expensive. The inspection 
requirements necessary to ensure obser-
vance of an agreement may involve 
elaborate and highly technical sur-
veillance or inspections systems which, 
in some cases, may be more expensive 
than the armaments themselves. Thus, 
even in terms of direct expenditures, 
arms control does not necessarily lead 
to savings. 
Somewhat more difficult to analyze 
is the matter of indirect effecls upon 
long-term costs. There are at least three 
ways in which indirect effects can pre-
vent us from realizing the anticipated 
savings from an arms control agreement. 
First, effective controls on one kind 
of armament may simply shift the arms 
competition to another kind of arma-
ment or, perhaps, to a qualitative basis 
if quantity' is controlled. In this case, 
arms expenditures may well continue as 
high as before, either through a redistri-
bution of expenditures on military hard-
ware or due to new R&D expenses and 
higher per-unit costs. 
Second, an arms control agreement 
may serve simply to change the timing 
of expenditures. The historical tendency 
of the United Statcs unilatcrally to 
alternate periods of low armament with 
periods of urgcnt rearmament, as in 
1941 and 1950, has almost certainly 
been economically wasteful as well as 
militarily awkward. To follow the sallle 
pattern through agreed' arms control-if 
the agrcement did not stick-could 
prove to be equally wasteful. 
Finally, as discussed more thor-
oughly earlier, an improperly conceived 
arms control plan can actually increase 
the chances of war-and the costs of 
modern war are such that they far 
overshadow any feasible peacetime 
savings on arms expenditure. Any saving 
which resulted in increased probability 
of war could prove to be both tem-
porary and illusory. 
Quite certainly, ceonomil's through 
arms reduction are possible. The point is 
that savings are not automatic, but need 
to hl' carefully assessed in terms of both 
dircet and indirect costs. 
Arms Control and Nonmilitary Ob-
jectives. The final critcrion against 
which any arms control proposal must 
be evaluated is its effect upon national 
objectives other than security. This is 
perhaps the most complex and most 
difficult to assess of all of the criteria-
hut so important that it cannot he 
ignored. No maller how wc define our 
national goals-life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness; human dignity; free-
dom and justice for all-security is only 
a very partial means to the achievement 
of those goals, and there is a real danger 
that some of the measures which en-
hance security in a military sense are 
inimical to other goals. 
There are a variety of considerations 
which fall into this category, ranging 
from the pacifist argument that all 
violence and therefore all implements of 
war are immoral and should be done 
away with on purely moral grounds, to 
the argument that the international ten-
sions engendered hy high levels of arma-
ment interfere with the proper opera-
tion of the international economic 
system. Beyond pointing out their po-
tential relevance, any comprehensive 
discussion of thcge varying concerns is 
outside the scope of this artiele. Hcre it 
is sufficient only to consider the most 
important nonmilitary implication of 
arms control: the view that high Icvels 
of armament tcnd to corrupt demo-
cratic institutions. 
There is a popular helief, in some 
ways a peculiarly, American helief, that 
there is a hasic incompatibility hctween 
standing military forces and the proper 
functioning of a dcmocratic political 
system. Perhaps lhe most systematic 
and well-known statement of this view 
is Harold La:.-:swe1l's "garrison-state 
hypothesis." First statcd in 19:~7 and 
periodically restated and revised sincc 
that time, the garrison-state hypothesis 
remains a leading theory of civil-military 
relations, not only among intcllectuals, 
bUl in the popular press as well. 
The essence of the garrison-state 
hypothesis is that a prolonged state of 
international tension incviLahly drives 
internal politics in the nations con-
cerned toward thc domination of spe-
cialists on violence. Lasswell has de-
scrihed it as "a model in which the 
sequence marches from the relatively 
mixed elite pattern of the nineteenth 
cl'ntury to military-police dominance in 
the impending future."5 Power becomes 
centralized in the hands of the executive 
and the military, with the legislature 
hecoming inl'rea~ingly impotent. The 
central govern nll'1l t expands until it 
penetratcs tlH~ whole society. In Lass-
well's view, thc danger of thus destroy-
ing free instituti9ns through the effect 
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of long continued preparation for war is 
a greater evil than war itself. 
To the extent that Lasswell's model 
is an accurate representation of the real 
world, an agreed program of arms con-
trol or reduction would help to preserve 
free institutions if it reduced interna-
tional tensions and diminished tenden-
cies toward centralization and govern-
mental expansion. 
The purpose of this discussion is not 
to attempt a detailed critique of the 
garrison-state hypothesis, but only to 
make a limited assessment. [An excel-
lent critique can be found in Hunting-
ton's The Soldier and the Slate.]6 Few 
would argue that prolonged tension and 
high levels of armament are beneficial to 
a free society-though the linkage be-
tWl!en democratic frailty and levels of 
armament is much less direct than Lass-
well would have us believe. After all, the 
rearmament of Germany followed, not 
preceded, the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic. 
The garrison-state hypothesis, as for-
mulated hy Lasswell, is in part based on 
a rather simplistic and villainous view of 
the professional military and an exag-
geration of their strength in modern 
society. By far the strongest part of his 
case lies in the linkage hetween long-
sustained high levels of armament and 
the tendency toward expansion of the 
government and centralization of 
power. In the pn!senee of long con-
tinued and obvious exlernal threats, 
lhere is a natural lendeney toward the 
dominance of national security concerns 
over individual interests. Dissent may 
become treason, so that long-continued 
tension is inimical to personal liberty. 
The growth of large industries depen-
dent upon military expenditures and the 
large bureaucratic requirements accom-
panying the maintenance of a large 
modern military establishment have a 
l'trong tendency to increase the size mill 
role of the federal government and lo 
centralize aUlhority. 
The two things which an effective 
450 
arms control agrcement could rea-
sonably be expected to do which 'would 
minimize the dangers outlined by Lass-
well are: (1) hy reducing international 
tensions and therefore national fears, 
reduce the degree to which security 
considerations influence governmental 
deeisions~ and (2) by reducing the level 
of armament, alleviate the tendencies 
toward bigness and centralization in-
herent in large-scale military organiza-
tion and procurement. 
The nonmilitary effects of any arms 
control or disarmament arrangement arc 
not only an important eonsidl'ration in 
evaluating it, hut olle of the more 
compelling reasons for entering into 
such an arrangement. The primary rea-
son for our concern with national se-
curity is the preservation of those values 
we rate most highly. It would be self-
defeating if, through the search for 
security, we lost that which we were 
attempting to preserve. 
The Utility of Arms Control. Many 
pl!ople tend to sec arms control or 
disarmament as an end in itself and 
therefore most discussions focus on the 
problem of how it is to be achieved, 
without careful consideration of what it 
is intended to achieve or what it is 
capahle of achieving. Without a clear 
understanding of ohjl'etives, arm~ con-
. trol can be self-defeating or even danger-
ous. 
This discussion has examined five 
objectives against which any attempt at 
arms control should be evaluated. These 
objectives are: a reduction in the proha-
bility of war; a reduction in the in-
tensity and duration of war; improve-
ment of our position relative to poten-
tial opponents; a reduction in security 
costs; and achievement of nonmilitary 
ohjeetives. These objectives apply to 
arms control and disarmament in all 
their forms, although there will he wide 
discrepancies in the way and extent to 
which various forms satisfy the tests. 
The ohjectives outlined may as appro-
priatcly he ul'er! to evaluate a scheme of 
unilateral disarmament as to evaluate a 
formal arms control treaty with elabo-
rate inspection provisions. 
Because of the multiplicity of ohjec-
tives which may be served by arms 
control and because no arms control 
arrangement can serve all objectives 
equally, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of the trade-offs re-
quired. An assessment of marginal 
utility is involved: it is necessary to 
compare the worth of incremental im-
provements in one area with 10SSl'S in 
anotlH'r. For example: we would all\lo~t 
certainly he willing to accept some loss 
ill military capability vis-a-vis the rest of 
the world in return for a reduced 
probability of war and a lower level of 
military investment. We would not, or 
should not, accept an arrangement 
which promised large economic savings 
while increasing the probability of nu-
clear war. 
No simple way of assessing these 
trade-offs exists, .for fundamental and 
necessarily subjective valucs arc con-
cerned. There is no substitute for a 
careful analysis of any arms control 
arrangement in terms of the magnitude 
and direction of the effect it will have 
on each of the five possible objectives; 
the prospective gains must he weighed 
against the prospective losses. Although 
it is obviously desirable to achieve the 
greatest benefit and the least loss, the 
interests of potential opponents limit 
the gains to be expe.eted. Fortunately, 
what is a gain for one is not necessarily 
a loss for the other, for both sides share 
a compelling interest in attempting to 
limit the violence, destruction, and 
bloodshed of human conflict. Few 
human values could survive a large-scale 
nnclear war. It is this shared intercst 
that makes agreement on arms control 
possihle-though by no means easy. 
In passing, iL is also important to 
note that formal agreements are not 
necessarily the only means to the 
achievement of effective arms control. 
Far too lillIe attention has been paid to 
the imaginative proposals for 
"graduated reciprocation in tension-
reduction" made by Charles Osgood in 
his brilliant lillIe hook t1 n A llernfllive 
to War or Surrender. r n essence, Os-
good's proposals amount to a program 
of reciprocal, stepped reductions in 
armament hascd upon tacit and in-
formal hargaining rather than formal 
agreements. Although there are serious 
difficulties involved in his proposals, 
there is no reason to believe that they 
arc any legs suscI:ptibh: to solution than 
thot"e involved in a negotiated agree-
ment. For example, one of the more 
serious difficulties, the lack of any 
effective inspection system, beeomes 
much less serious hecause of the recent 
improvements in national surveillance 
systems. 
Whatever the form of an arms con-
trol agreement, it is imperative that the 
ends we arc trying to achieve be kept 
clearly in view and that we do not let 
arms control or disarmament become an 
end in itself. Yet thrre is also a serious 
dan~I'r that an awareness of all of the 
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potential pitfalls of arms control will 
prevent it IH'ing undertake'n seriously as 
a means to our security. This would he a 
mistake. Properly coneeiwd and under-
taken, arms control can greatly enhanee~ 
our .security and may very well provc to 
be a neccssity if we are to avoid disaster. 
As we hecome accustomed to living 
under the nuclear cloud, there is danger 
of forgetting just how precarious a posi-
tion the world is in. A major war fought 
with nuclear, hiological, or chemical 
weapons could not conceivahly he of 
either immediate or long-term advantage 
to anyone and might well he the occasion 
of universal disaster. Yet paradoxically, 
hoth we and the Russians, in the interest 
of national security, continue to stock-
pile weapons which, if used, would he a 
disasterfor hoth. 
I t is difficult to be optimistic about 
the prospects for finding an easy way 
out of this dilemma. Mankind has not 
heretofore compiled a very enviable 
rccord in avoiding foreseeable disaster-
but we do have to try, and thc effort to 
achieve useful and workahle arms COll-
trol arrangements is one way of trying. 
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